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PATENTS AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR SOFTWARE FIRMS 
John R. Allison, Abe Dunn & Ronald J. Mann*  
We analyze the relation between patents and the different business models available to 
firms in the software industry.  The paper builds on Cusumano’s work defining the differences 
among firms that sell products, those that provide services, and the hybrid firms that fall between 
those polar categories.  Combining data from five years of Software Magazine’s Software 500 
with data about the patenting practices of those software firms, we analyze the relation between 
the share of revenues derived from product sales and the firm’s patenting practices.  Accounting 
for size, R&D intensity, and sector-specific effects, the paper finds a robust positive correlation 
between product-based business models and patenting rates.  We also present in this draft 
preliminary results suggesting that there is no significant relation between patenting practices 
and the extent to which the firm’s revenues are derived from software products and services, as 
opposed to hardware or other lines of business. 
1. Introduction:  If there is any single industry in which patents are 
controversial, it is the software industry.  Patents have spread rapidly through the industry 
in recent years, shortly after doctrinal changes that have made it easier to obtain reliable 
patents on software-related inventions.1  At the same time, there is a growing concern 
that the massive patent portfolios held by incumbent firms will chill innovation and entry 
in the industry.2
Still, empirical information about the role of software patents in the industry is 
scant.  The most detailed published study of the industry is Graham and Mowery’s 2003 
                                                 
* Allison is the Spence Centennial Professor in the Information, Risk, & 
Operations Management Department of the Red McCombs Business School, University 
of Texas.  Dunn is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Economics, University of 
Texas.  Mann is the Ben H. & Kitty King Powell Chair in Business and Commercial Law 
and Co-Director of the Center for Law, Business & Economics, at the University of 
Texas School of Law. 
1 See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 
83 Texas L. Rev. 961 (2005) [hereinafter Mann, Software Patents]. 
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3book chapter.   Their work studies patents in the listed UPC classes that are most 
commonly obtained by large software firms (primarily G06F).  Comparing patent grants 
in those classes against R&D expenditures for large packaged-software firms, they 
conclude that the propensity to patent (measured in patents per $100M R&D dollars) rose 
by about 50% (from about 2.0 to 3.0) from 1988 to 1996.  Regarding smaller firms,   
Mann’s working paper with Sager discusses the role of patents in venture-backed 
software startups.4  Generally, that paper shows that patents in the industry are used by 
only a minority of the 850 firms studied there (only 24% of the firms had patents at a date 
more than five years after their first financing).  At the same time, patent acquisition is 
significantly correlated with any of several variables that are indicators of success of the 
firms.  For example, 13% of the software firms with patents go public, while only 3% of 
those without patents go public.  For present purposes, that work is important because it 
suggests that patents play a role of some importance in the development of firms seeking 
to enter the software industry, albeit one that depends substantially on the type of firm. 
There has been a good deal of work, relying primarily on questionnaires, 
examining the value of patents in appropriating the profits of innovation in various 
industries.  In general, that literature shows a broad spectrum of industries in which the 
effectiveness and importance of patents ranges from important and central to trivial and 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Ronald J. Mann, Commercializing Open-Source Software: Do Property 
Rights Still Matter? (unpublished 2005 manuscript) [hereinafter Mann, Open Source]. 
3 Stewart J. H. Graham and David C. Mowery, Intellectual Property Protection in 
the U.S. Software Industry, in Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy 219 (Wesley 
M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003). 
4 Ronald J. Mann and Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software 
Start-Ups (unpublished 2005 manuscript). 
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5inconsequential.   There also has been a good deal of work, predominantly dealing with 
relatively large companies (for which data is more readily available) examining the 
relation between patent counts and R&D.6
There has been relatively little work, however, examining those problems on a 
firm-by-firm basis, within a particular industry, where the differences between particular 
types of firms can be captured on a micro-level.  The only published study that examines 
the role of patents on that basis is the recent study by Hall and Ziedonis of the role of 
patents in the semiconductor industry.7  Their paper studies a set of 100 large firms in the 
semiconductor industry, matching financial data with patent data to demonstrate that 
those firms have changed patenting behavior substantially between 1980 and 1995, with a 
substantial increase in patenting activity even after accounting for R&D expenditures and 
the size and types of firms. 
                                                 
5 Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and 
Development, 1987 Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 783; Wesley M. Cohen et al., 
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms Patent (Or Not) (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 
7552) (Feb. 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7552. 
6 E.g., Richard Blundell, Rachel Griffith & John van Reenen, Market Share, 
Market Value and Innovation in a Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 Rev. Econ. 
Stud. 529 (1999); Michele Cincera, Patents, R&D, & Technological Spillovers at the 
Firm Level: Some Evidence from Econometric Count Models for Patent Data, J. Applied 
Econometrics 265 (1997); Bruno Crepon & Emmanuel Duguet, Research and 
Development, Competition, and Innovation Pseudo Maximum Likelihood and Simulated 
Maximum Likelihood Methods Applied to Count Data Models with Heterogeneity, 79 J. 
Econometrics 355 (1997); Bruno Crepon & Emmanuel Duguet, Estimating the 
Innovation Function from Patent Numbers: GMM on Count Panel Data, 12 J. Applied 
Econometrics 243 (1997); Jose G. Montalvo, GMM Estimation of Count Panel Data 
Models with Fixed Effects and Predetermined Instruments, 15 J Bus. & Econ. Stat. 82 
(1997). 
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Although the literature provides no definitive theoretical framework for predicting 
when patents will be more and less useful, the most recent paper by Wesley Cohen and 
his co-authors takes steps toward a general explanation as part of a description of 
differences between the United States and Japan.8  In their view, patents can play two 
distinct roles: as tools for exclusion (to be exploited through production within the 
patentholding firm), and as tools for licensing (to be exploited through licensing outside 
the boundary of the patentholding firm).  They develop a distinction between “discrete” 
and “complex” products, finding evidence to support the idea that “complex” product 
industries in the United States rely more heavily on licensing to permit exploitation 
outside the boundaries of the firm.9
At first glance, it is difficult to apply that analysis to the software industry, 
because the software industry itself is strikingly heterogeneous.  The Software 500 (a 
ranking of the top revenue grossing software firms), for example, includes more than 100 
different sector designations within the industry.  Moreover, what little we know about 
patenting in the software industry suggests every reason to believe that the role of patents 
differs substantially within the industry itself.  For example, in Mann’s recent working 
paper with Sager studying a dataset of venture-backed software firms, patenting rates 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited: 
An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979–1995, 32 
Rand J. Econ. 101 (2001). 
8 Wesley M. Cohen, Akiro Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. 
Walsh, R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United 
States, 31 Research Pol’y 1349 (2002). 
9 Wesley M. Cohen, Akiro Goto, Akiya Nagata, Richard R. Nelson & John P. 
Walsh, R&D Spillovers, Patents and the Incentives to Innovate in Japan and the United 
States, Research Pol’y (forthcoming 2002). 
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10differed substantially from sector to sector.   The dataset analyzed in that paper does not 
contain R&D information and thus is not well suited to analyzing the differences in 
propensity to patent on a firm-by-firm or sector-by-sector basis. 
If we believe that the role of patents is important to the success of the firm as a 
profit-seeking enterprise, it would be natural for the utility of patents to relate to 
important distinctions in the business model that the firms pursues.  Accordingly, in an 
effort to make some sense out of the bewildering array of software markets, we turned to 
the most prominent explication in the business-school literature of the distinctions in 
business models of software firms, Cusumano’s continuum from products firms to 
services firms.11  To simplify his complex analysis, products firms generally are 
characterized by higher operating margins, higher growth rates, and less stable market 
shares, whereas services firms generally have lower operating margins and lower growth 
rates, but can more readily establish stable market positions.  From that perspective, the 
typical products firm (Microsoft, second in the current Software 500) is characterized by 
high-volume sales of non-customized products that customers can use “off the shelf” with 
little or no assistance.  At the other end of the spectrum is the typical services firm (EDS, 
third in the current Software 500), which generates revenues by helping firms to install, 
design, and maintain software.  In between is a large group of hybrid firms (like Oracle, 
eighth in the current Software 500).  Those firms generally started by attempting to sell 
products, but later were forced by market conditions to provide ever-increasing levels of 
                                                 
10 {See Table 3 in December 2005 Draft.} 
11 See Michael A. Cusumano, The Business of Software (2004). 
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customization, thus degrading their ability to sell high volumes of a pure high-margin 
product. 
Although Cusumano does not emphasize the point, it is implicit in his analysis 
that the products model is relatively more effective for venture-backed startups than the 
services model.  Because products firms can scale more easily than services firms – it is 
much easier to duplicate a product 10,000 times than the employees that provide services 
– successful products firms are more likely to produce the high returns venture capital 
investors seek.12
What is not clear from the existing literature is whether there is any relation 
between this distinction and the use of patents.  The value of the products-services 
distinction in explaining other aspects of software business suggests that it might provide 
a useful lens for exploring the reasons for the apparent disparity of patenting practices in 
the industry.  Moreover, a number of practical aspects of the industry suggested to us the 
likelihood that patents would be more useful for products firms than for services firms.  
For one thing, patents seem likely to be a relatively more effective tool for protecting 
innovation in products than in services.  To the extent a firm can provide a unique level 
of skilled services, it may be feasible to maintain much of the differentiating knowledge 
in a tacit form, bound up with the skills of the individual employees.13  Conversely, a 
products firm that sends its product out into the marketplace in many instances will be 
displaying its technology “near the surface” of the product, easily available for 
                                                 
12 See Mann, Open Source, supra note 2. 
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14appropriation by competitors.   If so, a patent that permits a firm to fence out 
competitors will have considerably more value to a products firm than to a services firm.  
This, in turn, suggests the hypothesis that products firms, because their technology is 
more difficult to protect than the technology of services firms, will produce more patents 
than services firms, all other things being equal. 
2. Data:  To investigate the role patents play in the software industry, we 
combined data from two separate sources.  First, we collected data about the firms from 
Software Magazine’s Software 500.  Relying on questionnaires disseminated by the 
magazine, that list indicates the top 500 firms in the software industry each year by 
revenue.  Anecdotally (based on interviews within the industry), we have the impression 
that the response rate is quite high.  The list appears to be widely regarded as 
authoritative within the industry.  Campbell-Kelly, for example, uses the list pervasively 
in his comprehensive history of the industry.15  It is, for example, considerably more 
comprehensive than the Softletter 100 that Graham and Mowery use, which is limited to 
prepackaged software providers (and thus generally excludes services firms). 
Because of considerable turnover in the industry, that list includes about 1000 
firms for the five years.  For each firm, the Software 500 list each year includes several 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 See Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri & Alfonso Gambardella, Markets for 
Technology: The Economics of Innovation and Corporate Strategy (2001) (discussing the 
importance of tacit knowledge). 
14 See Pamela Samuelson, Randall Davis, Mitchell D. Kapor & J.H. Reichman, A 
Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 
2308 (1994); Mann, Software Patents, supra note 1. 
15 Martin Campbell-Kelly, From Airline Reservations to Sonic the Hedgehog: A 
History of the Software Industry (2003). 
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data points of interest, the total revenues, total revenues from software-related activities, 
% of revenues expended on research and development, number of employees, and % of 
revenues generated by the sale of services.  Because the purpose of our study is to focus 
on firms that fairly can be characterized as software firms, we excluded the 18 firms that 
did not derive at least 20% of its total revenues from software in any of the five years for 
which we collected data.16
Of importance for our project, it extends from the largest firms in the industry 
(IBM and Microsoft were first and second throughout the five-year period) to quite small 
firms: the smallest firm in 2002, for example, was the firm of iCIMS, Inc., with annual 
revenues of only $400,000 (less than $35,000/month).  This is important because 
previous similar empirical studies (such as the papers by Graham and Mowery about the 
software industry and the papers by Hall and Ziedonis about the semiconductor industry) 
rely on CompuStat data, which necessarily limits the analysis to relatively large firms.  It 
also includes relatively recent information.  Our study focuses entirely on activity 
beginning in the late 1990’s, after the rise of the Internet and legal changes that arguably 
made it easier to obtain software patents.  Thus, our paper is the first effort in the existing 
literature to provide any information at all about patenting practices in the modern 
software industry. 
To quantify the patenting practices of the firms, we collected from Delphion a 
complete set of all of the 34,000 patents issued between January 1, 1998 and December 
                                                 
16 The excluded firms are Cisco, Hitachi, Intel, NEC, Raytheon, Valassis, 
PreVision Marketing, VCON, Adaptec, Alstom ESCA, Amdahl, Brooktrout, Infolmage, 
International Network Services, Kasten Chase, MessageQuest, Template Software, and 
TYX. 
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31, 2002 to each of the firms listed in the Software 500.  We then examined each of the 
20,000 patents issued to firms other than IBM.  {For the 14,000 IBM patents we read a 
random sample of about 300 patents and extrapolated from that sample.}  The question 
was whether the patent, properly speaking, should be treated as a patent on a software 
invention.   
Identifying a data set of software patents is a daunting task, to put it mildly.  This 
is so for several reasons.  First, there is no universally accepted definition of what a 
software patent is.  Second, neither the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
classification system nor the International Patent Classification (IPC) system was 
designed for such a purpose.  Both systems focus on specific functions at a very low level 
of abstraction and are unsuitable for defining any technology area at a conceptual level.  
Third, even if these systems were suitable for identifying for defining a technology area, 
software is a critical element of inventions in so many disparate fields that it could not be 
adequately captured by a classification system. 
To our knowledge, there have been only two significant efforts to identify a large 
data set of software patents.  Graham and Mowery,17 who did not attempt to define the 
term “software patent,” used the IPC system in an effort to develop a data set of software 
patents owned by packaged software firms.18  The IPC classes that they used do include 
large concentrations of patents on software inventions, but they also include substantial 
numbers of inventions that could not fall within anyone’s definition of a software patent.  
                                                 
17  Graham & Mowery, supra note 3. 
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Despite the inadequacy of the classification system for identifying software patents, the 
fact that they only included patents issued to packaged software firms means that their 
data set probably consisted almost exclusively of software patents.  Thus, although their 
data set is probably not significantly overinclusive, it obviously is very underinclusive.  
In other words, if one wishes to have a data set that is representative of all software 
patents, their method would not work. 
The other significant effort to identify a large set of software patents, by Bessen 
and Hunt,19 offers a definition of the term “software patent” that includes, correctly in 
our view, patents on inventions in which the data processing algorithms are carried out by 
code either stored on a magnetic storage medium or embedded in chips (“firmware”).20  
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Graham & Mowery first identified packaged software firms and studied the 
IPCs of patents issued to those firms.  They then selected those classifications to which 
large percentages of these firms’ patents had been assigned.  Id. 
19  JAMES BESSEN & ROBERT M. HUNT, AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT SOFTWARE 
PATENTS 7-9.  (Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 03-17, available at  
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf.   
20  As Bessen and Hunt note, id. at 9, one of the current authors, John Allison, 
earlier employed a definition of software patent that excluded firmware, including only 
inventions in which the code implementing the data processing algorithms are stored on a 
magnetic storage medium.  See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting 
What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2110-11 
(2000); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the U.S. Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 89 (2002); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The 
Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 1029 (2003).  The reasons 
for using this definition were a combination of initial doubt and compromise with a 
coauthor, followed by a need for consistency.  Each of those articles made use of the 
same data set of 1,000 randomly selected patents-in-general issued between mid-1996 
and mid-1998.  After a great deal more experience gained from closely reading thousands 
of computer-related patents, Allison became firmly convinced that the definition should 
include firmware.  When he used the same set of 1,000 randomly selected patents in a 
subsequent article, he studied each patent again and reclassified them using a definition 
that included firmware.  See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, Kimberly A. Moore, & R. 
Derek Trunkey, Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (definition not explicitly 
 10
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As we do, Bessen & Hunt reject the use of patent classifications for identifying a set of 
software patents.21  Rather, Bessen and Hunt studied a random sample of patents, 
classified them according to their definition, and then developed a keyword search 
algorithm to identify a large data set of software patents. 
We don’t quarrel so much with the Bessen & Hunt definition as we do with the 
use of a keyword search.  Allison’s studies of thousands of computer-related patents 
convince him that the use of language in the titles, abstracts, written descriptions, and 
claims of patents, even in those dealing with the same area of technology, can be highly 
idiosyncratic among different patent owners.  Moreover, software is a critical part of 
inventions in such far-flung fields that reliance on particular search terms will produce a 
data set that is substantially overinclusive and underinclusive at the same time.22
Turning to our methodology, we define a software patent as a patent in which at 
least one claim element consists of data processing, regardless of whether the code 
                                                                                                                                                 
provided in article).  Allison used this more inclusive definition not only in this paper, but 
also in an ongoing study of university patents.  Thus, when we say that identifying a large 
set of software patents is daunting, we speak from rich experience. 
21  Bessen & Hunt, supra note 19, at 10-11.  The Bessen & Hunt definition of a 
software patent appears to include patents on inventions that “use” software as part of the 
invention, but excludes those that “use” off-the-shelf software: 
Our concept of software patent involves a logic algorithm for processing data that 
is implemented via stored instructions; that is, the logic is not “hard-wired.” 
These instructions could reside on a disk or other storage medium or they could 
be stored in “firmware,” that is, a read-only memory, as is typical of embedded 
software. But we want to exclude inventions that involve only off-the-shelf 
software—that is, the software must be at least novel in the sense of needing to 
be custom-coded, if not actually meeting the patent office standard for novelty. 
 
Id. at 8. 
22  Bessen and Hunt identify substantial degrees of over- and underinclusiveness 
in the data set generated by their keyword search.  Id. at 9. 
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carrying out that data processing is on a magnetic storage medium or embedded in a chip.  
After a great deal of experience, study, and thought, we have found that this is the only 
definition that is both appropriately inclusive and can be applied with principled 
consistency.  Not only is it possible to apply the definition with consistency, but it also 
captures the realities of claim drafting.  It is common for all or most of the elements in a 
patent claim to cover the prior art, with only one or perhaps two elements covering the 
purported novel and nonobvious advance.  For example, computer hardware makers own 
large numbers of patents, the claims of which initially read as though they cover 
something like a generic router, printer, magnetic resonance imaging machine, or other 
hardware, when in fact the only purported novelty is in one element consisting of a 
function carried out by algorithms.  Also, a claim covers the entire invention, and in a 
case like this the entire invention is not just the new algorithms in isolation but instead is 
a piece of hardware that allegedly does something different because of the new 
algorithms.  Further, in the event of infringement in cases like this, one cannot calculate 
lost profits or reasonable royalties on the algorithms in isolation. 
The most obvious problem with our methodology is that it requires reading every 
patent, an extraordinarily slow and laborious process.  Although many patents are either 
obviously software patents or are obviously not software patents under this definition, 
there will always be a substantial percentage that must be studied with great care.23  
Claims are often quite obtuse, and in the computer field they are frequently rather broad, 
                                                 
23  If one is studying a large population of patents from the computer-related 
industries, the percentage that must be carefully scrutinized is far higher than if one is 
studying a population of patents across a broad array of fields. 
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necessitating a close reading of not only independent but also dependent claims and a not 
uncommon resort to the written description to help interpret claim language.  Another 
problem that simply cannot be avoided is that a degree of subjective judgment is 
occasionally required, which raises concerns about replicability.  As a result, we do not 
claim that our data set of software patents is perfect, but we do contend that our error rate 
is extremely small, certainly far smaller than in any data set acquired by means of short-
cuts such use of patent classifications or keyword searches.24
Using that methodology, about 68% (13,500) of the non-IBM patents qualified as 
software patents and about 55% of the IBM patents (extrapolating from the sample that 
we examined), for a blended total of about 62% (21,200) software patents.  To provide 
additional data points for robustness checks (as described below), we subsequently 
collected a set of all of the patents issued to the firms from January 1, 2003 through June 
30, 2005 (an additional 20,000 patents), but we did not analyze those patents to determine 
whether they were software patents or not. 
3. Analysis and Results 
o Descriptive Statistics: Because the existing empirical literature about 
patents in the software literature is so scant, even descriptive statistics about this dataset 
are interesting.  We start with some basic descriptive statistics, set out in Table 1.  
{Because our statistical analysis focuses on the results of R&D activity in 1998 and 1999, 
the Table presents information about the firm and about the patents that arose from 
                                                 
24  To the extent that there are any errors in our identification of a data set of 
software patents, those errors consist of not including a patent that should have been 
 13
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applications made during those years.}  As that Table shows, the patenting data are 
highly localized, with a mean of four patents and fourteen applications per firm, although 
more than three quarters of the firms show neither a patent nor an application.25  At the 
same time, R&D per Employee displays a relatively normal distribution.  This suggests 
on its face that there are important influences on patenting practices beyond the raw 
amount of investment in R&D. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics (1998-2000) 
# of Observations 1,114
# of Firms 646
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation First Quartile Median
Software Patents (For 1998-1999) 4.0 32.3 0.0 0.0
Patent Applications 13.8 170.3 0.0 0.0
R&D 104.2 1721.1 3.1 8.4
R&D per Employee 0.033 0.027 0.020 0.029
Employment (1000s) 2154.7 14688.2 118.0 297.0
Total Sales 670.1 5109.5 14.6 40.8
Fraction of Revenue from Services 30.3 24.0 10.0 28.0
Fraction of Revenues from Software 88.5 20.1 84.4 100.0
 
To see this point more clearly, consider Table 2 below, which displays detailed 
information about the distribution of firms that received patents based on applications 
filed during the period of data collection. 
                                                                                                                                                 
included.  Again, however, we believe that any errors of underinclusiveness in our data 
set are extremely small.  
25 Our patent and application data is necessarily truncated.  As discussed below, 
our analysis associates each patent with the year in which the application was filed.  Even 
now, there remains the possibility that patents will issue for which applications were filed 
in 1998 and 1999.  For reasons explained below, we do not believe that possibility 
undermines the robustness of our analysis. 
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Table 2: Distribution of Patent Portfolios 
Software Patents 
1998 and 1999 
All patents for the 
years 1998-2000  
# of Patents # of Obs. # of Obs. 
0 596 899 
1 49 90 
2 14 30 
3 5 17 
4 6 16 
5 0 3 
6 1 2 
7 4 2 
8 0 3 
9 1 2 
10 or more 27 50 
Total # Obs. 703 1114 
 
Our analysis also incorporates information on firm sectors.  There are widely 
heterogeneous sectors in the software industry that may also explain some of the 
differences in patenting practices between firms.  Because the Software 500 uses more 
than 100 different sectoral designations, many of the sectors include very few firms.  
Accordingly, we constructed a modified set of sectoral designations, which consolidates 
the Software 500’s designations into “only” 36 sectors.  The table below shows the 
different sectors within the software industry and some basic descriptive statistics for 
firms in each sector.  
 15
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Median Median Median Median Mean Median 75% 90%
Application Dev'l'pm't 6.95 220 0.032 22 0.23 0 0 1 61 42
Application Serv. Prov. 1.39 69.5 0.017 26 1.75 0 3.5 7 4 4
Asset/Technol. Mgmt. 7.38 421.5 0.027 38.5 0.00 0 0 0 12 7
Business Intelligence 12.83 446 0.029 28 0.37 0 1 1 27 20
Bus. Process Mgmt. 21.51 525 0.035 54 0.33 0 1 1 3 3
Computer Ass'd Draft'g 5.72 283 0.020 32 1.57 0 0 11 7 5
Content/Doc. Mgmt. 8.71 188.5 0.031 18 0.18 0 0 0 28 22
Collab./Proj. Mgmt. 10.40 376 0.029 38 0.00 0 0 0 4 2
Cust. Rel'nship Mgmt. 5.84 206 0.031 35 0.32 0 0 0 41 32
Database 18.84 505.5 0.032 25 9.69 0 2 62 16 12
Disaster Recovery 0.84 38 0.022 27 0.00 0 0 0 1 1
Data Warehouse 298.02 5679 0.044 12 15.29 0 49 57 7 5
Enterprise Appl. Integr'n 6.48 261 0.030 30.5 0.06 0 0 0 36 26
E-Business Applications 7.27 217.5 0.027 31 0.25 0 0 1 44 31
E-Commerce 13.57 195 0.032 13 0.00 0 0 0 5 5
E-Learning 34.18 1500 0.023 26 0.00 0 0 0 3 3
Enterprise Res. Planning 11.25 522.5 0.023 40.5 0.10 0 0 0 62 44
Financial Applications 8.29 270 0.027 32 0.02 0 0 0 42 29
Geogr. Info. Systems 18.05 420 0.029 9 6.00 0 9 32 7 5
Healthcare 3.33 106 0.020 22 0.00 0 0 0 9 6
Human Resources 3.05 31 0.022 26.5 0.00 0 0 0 16 10
Infrastructure 7.85 250 0.037 23 1.33 0 0 2 55 39
IT Sourcing 5.73 300 0.021 53 40.15 0 0 138 13 9
Marketing Automation 2.23 78 0.024 23 0.00 0 0 0 5 3
Middleware 5.67 200 0.029 17 0.42 0 1 2 19 16
Operating Systems 25.71 641 0.039 14.5 43.14 1 2 271 14 10
Portal Tools 3.32 151.5 0.026 34.5 0.00 0 0 0 8 7
Publishing/Graphics 9.12 300 0.034 0 3.20 1 4 11 5 5
Retail Applications 27.74 1068 0.026 74 0.00 0 0 0 1 1
Supply Chain 8.25 253 0.030 42.5 0.63 0 0 1 54 38
Security 12.11 450 0.032 13.5 1.50 0 1.5 6.5 20 15
Sales Force Automation 7.21 381 0.039 39.5 0.00 0 0 0 4 4
System Integration Servs 9.53 2240 0.011 49 65.00 0 35.5 361 16 10
Storage Management 3.79 135 0.032 11 7.14 0 4 43 7 5
Vertical Indus. Appl. 3.57 273.5 0.015 39.5 1.60 0 0 0 20 15
Wireless/Mobile 3.33 119.5 0.033 37 0.25 0 0.5 1 4 3
Other 6.04 164 0.031 20 1.65 0 0 2 23 17
Total # of Firms: 511
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The table shows the median of size and service revenue to show the heterogeneity of the 
typical market.  For example, the median data warehousing firm has about 5,000 
employees, while the median disaster recovery firm has only 38.  Similarly, the typical 
data warehousing firm derives only 12% of its revenues from services, while the median 
retail applications firm derives 74% of its revenues from services.  Of particular purport 
for our work is the great variation in patenting practices, with quite a number of 
reasonably well-populated sectors entirely devoid of patents (human resources software, 
for example), and others in which substantial portfolios exist (operating systems and 
systems integration services, for example, with an average of more than 40 patents per 
firm). 
o The Model: Because the basic purpose of our inquiry is to understand the 
relation between the business model of a particular firm and the patenting practices 
displayed in Table 2, we proceeded to construct a patent production function, generally 
following the methodology of Hall and Ziedonis.  The output of this production function 
is the number of patents applied for and successfully obtained by a firm.  The dependent 
variable naturally takes on the value of zero and positive integer values (i.e. 0,1,2,3…).  
Typical models used to examine this type of data are count models that include the 
commonly used Poisson and Negative Binomial models.  These models have been 
applied in several papers to examine patent production.  Papers using this approach 
include Hausman, Hall & Griliches (1984)26 27 and Hall and Ziedonis (2001)  that examine 
                                                 
26 Jerry Hausman, Bronwyn H. Hall & Zvi Griliches, Econometric Models for 
Count Data with an Application to the Patents R&D Relationship, 52 Econometrica 909 
(1984). 
 17
 Patents and Software Business Models March 24, 2006 Draft 18 
patent production in the semiconductor industry, and Bessen and Hunt (2001) examining 
software patents.  We discuss in detail below how we have addressed the problems in 
matching the distributional assumptions of those models to the characteristics of this 
dataset. 
Similar to previous work we assume that the number of patents applied for in a 
year is a function of a firm’s R&D spending and other characteristics of the firm.  The 
subscript i  denotes the firm, and the subscript  denotes the year.  The number of patents 
produced by firm i  at time t  is denoted by the variable .  We assume that the number 
of patents is a function of observable and unobservable factors.  The primary estimates in 
this paper assume that the unobserved component has a Poisson distribution.  Under the 




)exp()( βitti xyE =(1)      
The expectation of the model is a function of observed exogenous variables  
and a vector of parameters 
itx
β .  The parameters of the model are estimated using 
maximum likelihood.  We note here an important feature of our analysis.  In general, a 
maximum likelihood model will not be consistent unless the distributional assumption of 
the model is correct.  However, Gourierox, Monfront & Trognon (1984)28 show that if 
the mean of the above equation is correctly specified then the estimate of β  will be 
consistent even if the data rejects the Poisson distributional assumption.  The standard 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 Hall & Ziedonis, supra note 7. 
28 Christian S. Gourieroux, Alain Montfort & Alain Trognon, Pseudo Maximum 
Likelihood Methods: Application to Poisson Models, 52 Econometrica 701 (1984). 
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errors must be corrected to be robust to alternative distributions.   This is important 
because the assumption that the variance of the Poisson model is equal to the mean is 
restrictive and often (as with the data here) incorrect in practice, typically when the 
excess of the variance over the mean reflects “over-dispersion.”  
o Variables: The variables analyzed here include patent counts for firms and 
exogenous variables explaining those patents.  All the variables examined in this paper 
are specific to a particular firm in a year.  This paper explores two measures of patent 
output.  
One measure includes a count of the number of software patents applied for and 
received by the firm in the year.  Each of the 54,000 patents was allocated to the year in 
which the patent application was filed.  Because there is a lag in the time between a 
patent is applied for and received, we can be sure that the July 2005 searches did not 
locate all of the patents attributable to applications for any year in this dataset (the earliest 
year being 1998).  Nevertheless, the information the dataset reveals about the time of 
patent examination allows us to assess the extent of the truncation problem.  Thus, it 
appears from the data that the median number of years it takes to have a software 
application approved is 2.47 years and the 75th percentile is 3.08 years.  This suggested 
that the truncation issues for 2000-2002 would be quite serious, but that those issues 
would not be serious for 1998 and 1999 – the fastest granted 1999 application we could 
have missed would have undergone more than five and one-half years of examination and 
the fastest 1998 application truncated by our search would have languished in the PTO 
for six and one-half years.  Accordingly, the analysis presented below relies only on the 
2833 software patents issued with respect to 1998 and 1999 applications. 
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A second measure includes a count of the total number of patents including the 
number of software and other patents received with respect to applications filed in a 
particular year.  As discussed above, this rests on searches to locate patents issued from 
January 1, 1998 through June 30, 2005.  Because we have collected an additional year of 
total patent information, we analyze three years of total patent data (1998, 1999, and 
2000), which involves a total of 15,420 patents. 
The primary explanatory variables relate to the lines of business of the firm.  We 
have two such variables: Services and Fraction of Software Sales.  The Services variable 
is the fraction of software revenues that are from services multiplied by 100.  This 
variable enters the model linearly.  The second business line variable, Fraction of 
Software Sales, is the software sales for the current year, divided by total revenues, 
multiplied by 100.  This variable is a proxy for how much of the firm is concentrated on 
software.  Because many of the largest software firms are predominantly engaged in the 
sale of hardware (firms like Hewlett-Packard and Sun), this variable might capture 
differences in patenting practices between hardware firms and software firms.  Both the 
Fraction of Software Sales variable and the Services variables are expressed as 
percentages falling in the range between 0 and 100. 
We also use a number of other control variables.  The most important variable 
explaining the number of patents produced is R&D Expenditure in 2002 dollars.  This is a 
key explanatory variable in the estimations in our paper, as it has been in previous papers 
such as Hall & Ziedonis (2001).  A second major control variable is the size of the firm 
measured by the number of employees in thousands, Employee.  In addition, the intensity 
of R&D investment for the size of the firm is also used (R&D/Employee).  These 
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variables enter the production function in the log form including, log(Employee), 
log(R&D), and log(R&D/Employee).  We use the log form because of the large 
differences in the size of firms observed in the data.  The log transformation captures the 
skewed nature of the variables in the sample, and allows for interpretation of coefficients 
as constant elasticities.    The R&D variable takes on a zero value for some observations, 
but the log of zero is undefined.  To account for this problem, we include a variable Zero 
R&D that is 1 when R&D=0 and 0 otherwise.  The variables log(R&D) and 
log(R&D/Employee) are set equal to zero in the cases where R&D=0.  Firms observed as 
having 0 R&D represent less than 1% of the data. 
Another set of control variables are year dummies, which account for shifts in 
patenting rates over the years. 
o Results Using Software Patents: 
Table 4 below summarizes the results of analysis using software patents as the 
dependent variable.  Because the Services variable is a fraction of software revenues, and 
because our hypothesis is that the devotion of the firm to a products model should relate 
positively to the firm’s propensity to patent innovations related to software, this model 
should provide the clearest test of our primary hypothesis.  We report t-statistics in 
parentheses after the coefficient.   
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Table 4:  Propensity to Produce Software Patents
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.889 (3.83) 0.828 (3.28) 0.599 (2.56) 0.934 (3.44)
Log(Employee) 1.171 (14.86) 1.094 (13.84) 1.138 (12.07) 1.061 (12.09)
Services -0.023 -(2.87) -0.040 -(5.58) -0.015 -(2.11) -0.020 -(2.43)
Fraction Software Sales -0.009 -(1.78) -0.002 -(0.25) -0.008 -(2.43) -0.005 -(0.65)
Zero R&D -4.770 -(5.11) -4.259 -(2.33) -4.020 -(5.07) -4.907 -(2.38)
Year 1999 0.009 (0.04) -0.096 -(0.31) -0.136 -(0.54) -0.225 -(0.70)
Constant -3.788 -(2.42) -3.555 -(2.84) 1.349 -(0.23) -3.797 -(2.74)
Alpha 4.458 (6.25) 2.921 (5.67)
Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
# Observations 703 703 612 612
# Firms 511 511 445 445
log-likelihood -1049 -500.2 -749.8 -448.7
(4)  Negative 
Binomial(1)  Poisson (3)  Poisson
(2)  Negative 
Binomial
 
Poisson: The first column is the baseline Poisson specification.  The first test of 
the main hypotheses is based on the coefficient on the Services variable in the first 
column of the table.  The estimates show the coefficient on the service variable to be both 
negative and statistically significant, providing supporting evidence for the main 
hypothesis.  Therefore, holding all other factors fixed, an increase in the fraction of 
revenues from software services implies fewer patents are produced.  The impact of the 
Services variable on the number of patents shows that a 1% increase in the percent of 
software sales coming from services (e.g. percent of sales increasing from 50% to 51%), 
implies a 2.3% decrease in the number of patents produced.  A more extreme result 
suggests that the magnitude of the Services variable is also economically significant.  A 
firm that derives all its revenues from products (e.g. Service =0%) is expected to produce 
230% more patents than a firm entirely devoted to providing services (e.g. 
Service=100%).   
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The variables capturing R&D intensity, log(R&D/Employee) and those capturing 
firm size, log(Employee), are of particular interest to examine and compare to other 
results in the literature.  The coefficients on these variables may be interpreted as 
constant elasticities.  For instance, all other things held fixed, the coefficient of 1.17 on 
log(Employee) implies that a 10% increase in the number of employees causes an 11.7% 
increase in the number of software patents.   This result is slightly higher, but comparable 
to other results found in the literature, including Hall and Ziedonis (2001) that find a 
coefficient of .989 in the semi-conductor industry and Bessen and Hunt (2004) who find 
a coefficient of .88 in the production of software patents by firms that are not necessarily 
in the software industry.  Together with the other results, this suggests that returns to 
scale in number of employees is approximately constant in the software industry.  In 
other words, the firms patent in proportion to their size, so that a doubling in the size of a 
firm is predicted to cause a doubling in the number of patents produced.  The elasticity of 
R&D intensity on patenting is .89.  Again, this is similar to the results found by Bessen 
and Hunt (2004) of 1.01.29  However, these estimates are much larger than results in the 
semiconductor industry of .18 found by Hall & Ziedonis (2001).  Generally, this suggests 
that the effects of size in the software industry are about the same as those in the semi-
conductor industry, but that the effect of R&D intensity on software patenting is quite a 
bit greater than its effect on semi-conductor patenting.  This may reflect the importance 
                                                 
29 Bessen and Hunt (2001) find different results when accounting for firm level 
heterogeneity using fixed effects. However, their fixed effect estimation excludes firms 
with zero patents.  Such firms include a majority of firms in this paper and in the Bessen 
and Hunt paper.  Therefore, we compare the basic Poisson regressions as these include all 
firms and are less prone to sample selection bias. 
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of people as an input into innovation in the software industry relative to the 
semiconductor industry.  
The other variables used in the estimation help control for various other factors 
that affect patent production.  For example Fraction of Software Sales accounts for the 
possibility (suggested in interviews reported in Mann (2005)) that patenting practices will 
vary depending on how much the firm is devoted to selling software products – because 
hardware firms will patent more than software firms.  Although this variable is 
sometimes statistically insignificant, and the coefficients are quite small compared to the 
coefficients on the variables discussed above, these estimates do tend to suggest what was 
suggested in those interviews: the estimates suggest the possibility that firms that have a 
larger fraction of revenue coming from software and other products produce less patents.   
Another important control variable is a year dummy variable.  The dummy 
variable accounts for shifts in patenting practices over the years, and also helps account 
for any remaining truncation that may limit the number of patents observed in 1999 
relative to 1998.  The low coefficient and t-statistic for that variable support our view that 
truncation problems are relatively minor: if truncation were affecting our results, we 
would expect 1998 and 1999 to differ in some noticeable way, because truncation for 
1999 is likely to be greater than for 1998. 
Finally, as one might expect, the control variable Zero R&D is found to be 
negative and significant.   
Negative Binomial: Although the goodness of fit test rejects the Poisson 
distributional assumption, we nevertheless report the results of this analysis, following 
Gourierox, Monfront & Trognon (1984), discussed above.  As recommended there, we 
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30use heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors to calculate t-statistics.   Still, even though 
the Poisson estimates are consistent, they are less efficient than a maximum likelihood 
model with a correctly specified distribution.  One model typically used when 
overdispersion is present is the Negative Binomial model.  The Negative Binomial model 
is consistent only if the true distribution is Negative Binomial; however, if this is the true 
specification then the estimate is more efficient than the Poisson model.  The second 
model in Table 4 shows estimates from the Negative Binomial II model.  The parameter 
alpha is the overdispersion parameter.  Alpha is significantly different from zero 
suggesting overdispersion is present in the Negative Binomial model.   The results found 
using the Negative Binomial model do not change the key results.  The coefficients and t-
statistics on firm size and R&D intensity are close to those found using the Poisson 
model, and the magnitude of the service coefficient remains statistically significant.  In 
fact, the coefficient on the service variable increases to .399, which is nearly double the 
effect found using the Poisson model.    
Fixed Effects Models: Columns (3) and (4) include sector-specific fixed effects 
that control for differences in the propensity to patent across different sectors in the 
software industry.  Inclusion of the sector fixed effects is important for two reasons.  
First, from the previous estimates it is unclear whether the effect the service variable is 
capturing different propensities to patent because of differences in the services across 
sector, or whether the product/services distinction is also important within sectors.  
                                                 
30 The goodness of fit test is based on the deviance statistic.  The standard error 
estimates used to compute the t-statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
misspecification of the distribution.  To account for the multiple observations of some 
firms and the consequent possibility of autocorrelation, the standard errors are clustered. 
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Inclusion of the sector fixed effects along with the service variable focuses the test of the 
service variable.  Specifically, this model tests the hypothesis of whether the 
product/services distinction is important within sectors.  The second reason to include 
sector fixed effects is that a key assumption for estimates to be consistent is that the error 
term ijtε  be uncorrelated with the exogenous variables .  If there are unobserved 
characteristics in the sector that are correlated with  then both the Poisson and 
Negative Binomial models from column (1) and (2) are inconsistent.  Including sector 
specific fixed effects corrects for this type of inconsistency by allowing for correlation 




Inclusion of sector specific fixed effect necessitates dropping several observations 
from the analysis.  Sectors that have no patents are excluded from the analysis because 
the sector specific fixed effects entirely explain the number of patents in those sectors.  In 
addition, the sector category marked “Other” is also excluded because it does not 
represent any particular sector.31  The sector fixed effect estimates are based on the 
remaining 612 observations from the 445 remaining firms.   We test the joint statistical 
significance of the sector fixed effects by using a likelihood ratio test based on the 
selected sample with 612 observations.  For both models, we reject the null hypothesis 
that the sector specific fixed effects have no explanatory power at the 95% confidence 
level. 
The results of the Poisson model and the Negative Binomial show that the 
Services variable continues to be negative and statistically significant.  What this suggests 
                                                 
31 The results do not change significantly if the “Other” category is included in the 
estimates. 
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is that the devotion of a firm to a products or services model is important, even within a 
particular sector.  Thus, the data do not suggest simply that some sectors of the industry 
rely more on products and some more on services, or that levels of patenting activity 
reflect those differences.  The data suggest that there are important differences along the 
products/services continuum, even within particular sectors, and that differences even at 
that specific level relate to differences in patenting activity.  These results suggest that the 
product/services distinction is important within software sectors.  To be sure, the 
magnitude of the coefficients on Services does drop considerably (from .023 and .040 to 
.015 and .020, respectively), but this apparently suggests that the sectoral differences 
capture a portion of the difference in patenting activity.32  
Lagged Data: The above estimates use the explanatory variables from the same 
year as the dependent variable.  However, one might be concerned that there is actually a 
lagged effect of services or other explanatory variables on patenting.  Table 5 below 
provides both the Poisson and Negative Binomial estimates of the number of patents 
from 1999 based on lagged explanatory variables observed in 1998.  Due to limitations in 
the data, there were only 192 observations to perform this robustness check.  The results 
show that the Services variable continues to have a negative coefficient in both estimates, 
though it loses its significance in the Poisson model.  {Table 8 in the next section 
analyzes lagged data involving total patents, for which we have more data points.} 
                                                 
32 The drop is not caused by a change in the sample from specifications (1) and 
(2) to specifications (3) and (4).  Runs that we do not report show approximately the 
same magnitude in the Services variable if we use specifications (1) and (2) for the 612 
observations available for specifications (3) and (4). 
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Table 5:  Propensity to Produce Software Patents
Lagged Variables
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.196 (0.58) -0.048 -(0.08)
Log(Employee) 1.254 (8.24) 1.290 (6.22)
Services -0.014 -(0.89) -0.087 -(2.98)
Fraction Software Sales -0.006 -(0.83) 0.008 (0.47)
Zero R&D 0.256 (0.18) 1.010 (0.34)
Year 1999 - - - -
Constant -7.982 -(3.04) -7.707 -(2.41)
Alpha 5.934 (3.28)
Sector Fixed Effects No No
# Observations 192 192
# Firms 192 192
log-likelihood -251.6 -126.4
(1)  Poisson
(2)  Negative 
Binomial
 
o Results Using All Patents: We also analyzed a model using total patents as the 
dependent variable.  This model has the advantage that we have more data points 
(because we have collected an additional year of patent data that have not been broken 
down into software and non-software patents).  Thus, we analyze three years of data 
(1998, 1999, and 2000) rather than the two years analyzed in the previous section.  It also 
has the advantage that it provides a more accurate test of our second hypothesis (related 
to Fraction of Software Sales).  On the other hand, it has the disadvantage that it is tied 
less precisely to our primary hypothesis related to Services, so with respect to that 
variable it serves primarily as a robustness check. 
One problem that arises in using the total number of patents is that there are more 
outlier observations for the dependent variable on total number of patents produced 
relative to the number of software patents.  Specifically, there are 9 observations (for five 
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33firms) where a firm has over 500 patents,  while the remaining observations have 200 or 
fewer patents.  The approach taken to deal with these outliers is to analyze the data both 
with and without the outliers.  Tables 6 and 7 shown below include the same analysis as 
table 4, but with the dependent variable of total patents by the firm with respect to 
applications from a particular year.    Table 6 includes the outliers, while Table 7 
excludes them.  The most obvious effect of including the outliers is to decrease the 
coefficient on R&D intensity, Log(R&D/Employee).  Also, the outliers seem to affect 
coefficient estimates in the Poisson model, but have little effect on the Negative Binomial 
model.  A likely reason for the outliers affecting the Poisson model is that there is no 
error term to account for the additional dispersion in the error term caused by including 
the outliers.  The remainder of this section focuses on estimates that exclude the 9 
outliers.  Excluding the 9 outliers, the impact of both patenting intensity and firm size are 
similar to the estimates using the number of software patents as the dependent variable.  
Note that the key hypothesis predicting a negative coefficient on the variable Services 
holds whether or not the outliers are excluded. 
                                                 
33 The outliers are IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Sun, Microsoft, and Compaq. 
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Table 6:  Propensity to Produce Patents exlcluding Outliers
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.614 (2.31) 0.915 (4.81) 0.681 (2.70) 0.800 (4.53)
Log(Employee) 1.071 (13.88) 1.046 (13.79) 1.143 (14.43) 1.055 (14.41)
Services -0.026 -(3.80) -0.033 -(5.27) -0.015 -(2.28) -0.025 -(4.63)
Fraction Software Sales -0.008 -(2.13) -0.004 -(0.78) -0.008 -(1.60) -0.004 -(0.94)
Zero R&D -4.219 -(4.08) -5.157 -(6.05) -4.001 -(3.89) -4.148 -(4.85)
Year 1999 0.442 (1.49) 0.479 (1.53) 0.527 (2.26) 0.443 (1.87)
Year 2000 -0.121 -(0.38) -0.179 -(0.53) 0.116 (0.52) -0.221 -(0.91)
Constant -3.770 -(3.69) -2.869 -(3.67) -5.376 -(4.33) -4.333 -(4.09)
Alpha 4.187 (5.89) 3.135 (5.89)
Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
# Observations 1105 1105 1029 1029
# Firms 642 642 589 589
log-likelihood -1975 -905.2 -1427 -830
(4)  Negative 
Binomial(1)  Poisson (3)  Poisson




Table 7:  Propensity to Produce Patents including Outliers
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.275 (2.16) 0.954 (5.19) 0.120 (1.24) 0.868 (5.21)
Log(Employee) 1.472 (16.55) 1.115 (16.07) 1.513 (11.95) 1.123 (17.21)
Services -0.023 -(3.67) -0.033 -(5.19) -0.011 -(1.47) -0.024 -(4.53)
Fraction Software Sales 0.002 (0.45) -0.007 -(1.42) 0.000 (0.17) -0.007 -(1.66)
Zero R&D -2.870 -(5.00) -5.472 -(6.85) -1.915 -(3.00) -4.807 -(5.97)
Year 1999 0.105 (0.32) 0.492 (1.50) -0.350 -(0.88) 0.441 (1.82)
Year 2000 0.043 (0.14) -0.129 -(0.37) -0.462 -(1.12) -0.197 -(0.81)
Constant -8.942 -(7.30) -2.925 -(3.64) -10.749 -(9.25) -4.276 -(4.06)
Alpha 3.999 (5.69) 2.996 (5.81)
Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
# Observations 1114 1114 1038 1038
# Firms 646 646 593 593
log-likelihood -3570 -988.7 -2098.4 -911.8
(4)  Negative 
Binomial(1)  Poisson (3)  Poisson
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The second hypothesis examined in this paper is that the fraction of sales from 
software products or services will have some effect on the propensity to patent.  To test 
this hypothesis we look at the coefficient on the variable Fraction of Software Sales.  
Because the hypothesis here relates to the overall patenting philosophy of the firm, the 
hypothesis is tested more directly with the data in this section of the paper as the 
dependent variable (total patents) rather than the more limited data on software patents 
analyzed above.  The results, however, are similar to those for the software patents data.  
Thus, the coefficient on Fraction of Software Sales is quite small and almost always 
negative, but now the coefficient attains occasional significance.  Therefore, there is 
some evidence that more software-oriented firms patent less.  However, further evidence 
is necessary to determine whether this result holds.  A key limitation in testing this 
hypothesis is that the Fraction of Software Sales has a limited range between 80% and 
100% because all firms that have a Fraction of Software Sales variable less than 80% are 
dropped.  Our skepticism in the robustness of the results related to this variable is 
bolstered by the occasional positive coefficients (particularly in Table 8 discussed 
below). 
Finally, Tables 8A and 8B shown below include a number of additional 
robustness checks.  The first columns reflect a Random Effect Poisson estimate that 
includes sector-specific fixed effects.  This model follows the work by Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches (1984).  The Random Effect Poisson model assume that there is a firm 
specific error term that is independent of the  and has a Gamma distribution.  The 
coefficient on the Services variable is both negative and significant, supporting the 
ijtx
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hypothesis distinguishing product and service firms.  The estimates also show that the 
coefficient on Fraction of Software Sales is both positive and insignificant. 
The second specification includes firm-level fixed effect estimates.  This model is 
desirable because it accounts for potentially important firm-specific heterogeneity.  
However, about three-quarters of the sample observations must be dropped to estimate 
this model, because it must exclude firms that do not patent.  Therefore, the fixed effect 
estimates eliminate the potential bias caused by firm-specific error correlated with 
exogenous variables, , but introduces sample selection bias caused by dropping 
approximately 3/4 of the relevant sample.  Again, as in all of our specifications, the 
estimates show a negative coefficient on the Services variable, but it has lost its 
significance with the truncation of the sample.  Supporting our skepticism related to the 
Fraction of Software Services variable, the estimates show a positive (and insignificant) 
coefficient on that variable.   
ijtx
The remaining specifications in table 8A, (3)-(6), follow the estimates previously 
examined, but following the specifications in Table 5 these estimates only include lagged 
exogenous variables.  The estimates support much of the previous findings.  The 
coefficient on the Services variable is negative and significant for all estimates, and the 
sign and significance of the coefficient on Fraction of Software Sales varies depending 
on the model.  The estimates also show that R&D intensity and firm size are comparable 
to magnitudes found in previous estimates, with the exception that the impact of R&D 
intensity on the propensity to patent in the Negative Binomial models is noticeably higher 
in these lagged specifications.   
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Table 8:  Propensity to Produce Patents without Outliers
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.392 (3.24) 0.131 (0.46) 0.656 (2.02) 1.167 (3.62) 0.613 (1.72) 1.230 (4.45)
Log(Employee) 1.008 (13.59) 0.581 (1.84) 1.025 (11.28) 1.165 (11.04) 1.250 (9.78) 1.234 (13.74)
Services -0.010 -(4.21) -0.007 -(1.12) -0.019 -(2.30) -0.049 -(5.69) -0.028 -(2.39) -0.054 -(5.61)
Fraction Software Sales 0.002 (0.88) 0.001 (0.12) -0.008 -(1.51) 0.000 (0.02) -0.013 -(2.09) 0.002 (0.25)
Zero R&D -2.494 -(1.80) -1.046 -(0.09) -4.515 -(2.53) -5.012 -(3.44) -2.909 -(1.73) -5.068 -(4.13)
Year 1999 0.088 (1.00) -0.007 -(0.02) - - - - - - - -
Year 2000 -0.358 -(3.34) -0.373 -(1.09) 0.323 (1.40) 0.638 (1.75) 0.078 (0.35) 0.457 (1.53)
Constant -6.250 -(7.83) -3.287 -(2.52) -2.754 -(1.85) -6.014 -(3.20) -4.070 -(2.75)
Alpha 3.282 (7.26) 3.717 (5.16) 2.718 (5.15)
Sector Fixed Effects Yes No No No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No Yes No No No No
Random Effects Yes No No No No No
Lag Variables No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Observations 1029 250 464 464 441 441
# Firms 589 107 348 348 329 329
log-likelihood -820.9 -251.8 -992.6 -403.3 -602.7 -366.7
(6)  Neg. 
Binomial(2)  Poisson(1)  Poisson (3)  Poisson
(4)  Neg. 
Binomial (5)  Poisson
 
Capital intensity is another commonly used variable in analyzing the propensity 
of firms to patent.  Capital intensity is usually measured using the ratio of property, plant 
and equipment (PP&E) to the number of employees in the company.  For many 
industries, capital intensity is important as it accounts for the use of capital in the 
discovery of new and patentable ideas.  This seems less important in the software 
industry, which depends less on equipment and more on the creativity of developers.  
Arguably, the capital invested in the office latte machine that helps keep employees alert 
and happy may be as important as the speed of the computers in the office.  
 33
 Patents and Software Business Models March 24, 2006 Draft 34 
Although there are good arguments for excluding capital intensity, it is important 
to check if the above results are robust to the inclusion of capital intensity in the analysis.  
A bias could arise from excluding capital intensity if it is an important explanatory 
variable that is correlated with the Services variable or Fraction of Software Sales.  It is 
not included in previous estimates because data on property, plant and equipment is not 
provided in the Software 500 data.  To check the robustness of the results from the 
inclusion of capital intensity, we add information on PP&E to the current sample from 
COMPUSTAT data.  The COMPUSTAT data includes only larger firms which leaves 
just 540 observations from the sample using all patents.34  Table 8B below repeats the 
analysis of table 6, but includes the capital intensity variable log(PP&E/Emp).       
There are no qualitative changes for either the services variable or fraction of 
software sales in Table 8B.  In addition, the estimates show that only one of the four 
estimates included in table 8B show that capital intensity is statistically significant.  
Columns (3) and (4) of the above estimates suggest that after controlling for sector fixed 
effects, capital intensity does not have a statistically significant effect on patenting.  
Comparing the estimates to those of Hall and Ziedonis, the estimates in table 10 suggest 
that relative to the semiconductor industry, the software industry has lower returns to 
capital intensity while returns to R&D intensity per person is greater.     
                                                 
34 Similar analysis is done using the sample of software patent firms and we 
obtain similar results. 
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Table 9:  Propensity to Produce Patents exlcluding Outliers
Log(R&D/Employee) 0.288 (0.87) 0.777 (3.26) 1.042 (4.83) 0.922 (3.73)
log(PP&E/Employee) 0.304 (1.10) 0.420 (1.95) 0.144 (0.68) 0.260 (1.21)
Log(Employee) 0.991 (11.07) 1.021 (10.07) 1.041 (14.41) 1.061 (10.40)
Services -0.027 -(3.76) -0.034 -(4.73) -0.012 -(1.85) -0.025 -(4.01)
Fraction Software Sales -0.005 -(1.09) -0.005 -(0.88) -0.004 -(1.53) -0.005 -(0.96)
Zero R&D -22.368 -(14.60) -26.823 -(20.51) -28.488 -(19.80) -30.802 -(20.51)
Year 1999 0.221 (1.07) 0.648 (1.68) 0.287 (2.32) 0.559 (2.04)
Year 2000 -0.461 -(1.91) -0.077 -(0.17) -0.079 -(0.47) -0.147 -(0.53)
Constant -3.009 -(2.72) -1.415 -(1.21) -2.834 -(2.75) -2.274 -(1.48)
Alpha 3.105 (4.62) 2.222 (4.84)
Sector Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes
# Observations 540 540 512 512
# Firms 289 289 270 270
log-likelihood -1366.732 -618.7961 -790.6934 -562.8168
(1)  Poisson (2)  Negative Binomial (3)  Poisson (4)  Negative Binomial
 
 
An Analysis of Sector Specific Fixed Effects: 
Several of the previous estimates have included sector fixed effects.  This section 
takes a closer look at the fixed effect estimates to explore the heterogeneity in patenting 
by sector, controlling for all other variables.  Table 10 below shows the sector fixed 
effects for the Poisson and Neg. Binomial estimates from the estimates in Table 4.  Table 
10 lists the various software sectors in order of the largest to smallest fixed effects in the 
Poisson estimates.  For example, holding all other factors constant, the Vertical Industrial 
Applications sector has the highest marginal effect on patenting followed by Application 
Service Providers.  The estimates from the Negative Binomial model are also included in 
order to check the robustness of the rankings to distributional assumptions.  The sectors 
with the highest propensity to patent include Vertical Industrial Applications, Application 
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Service Providers, Geographic Information Systems, Operating Systems, 
Publishing/Graphics, Security, Database, and Wireless/Mobile.  There are a number of 
sectors that seem to patent less than the typical sector.  Sectors that tend to have fewer 
software patents include Financial Applications, Enterprise Resource Applications, E-
Business Applications, Enterprise Application Integration, Application Development, 
Content/Document Management, Business Process Management, and Data Warehouse.  
   Those results are interesting, in that they parallel similar results in Mann & Sager 
(2005), showing a substantial difference in patenting practices even within the software 
industry.  Given the limitations of our current dataset, however, we can only speculate as 
to the causes.  In some cases (such as security), they might be driven by early pioneer 
patents (that make patenting by later entrants more important).  In others, they might be 
driven by the nature of innovation in the particular sector – with higher rates of patenting 
in sectors in which the innovation is more readily appropriated by patent and lower rates 
in those in which it is less useful to patent.  For present purposes, however, we present 
the results only for informational purposes.  
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Table 10:  Sector Fixed Effect Analysis 
Software Sector # Firms # Obs
Fixed Effect S.E. Rank Fixed Effect S.E.
VA Vertical Indus. Appl. 15 20 1.925 (0.82) 1 0.841 (0.85
ASP Application Serv. Prov. 4 4 1.883 (0.45) 2 1.464 (0.68
GIS Geogr. Info. Systems 5 7 1.607 (0.69) 3 1.288 (0.81
OS Operating Systems 10 14 1.591 (0.75) 4 1.071 (0.65
PU Publishing/Graphics 5 5 1.473 (0.58) 5 1.435 (0.79
SEC Security 15 20 1.392 (0.77) 6 1.492 (0.94
DB Database 12 16 1.215 (0.42) 7 0.785 (0.68
WVM Wireless/Mobile 3 4 1.202 (1.24) 8 1.686 (1.22
SC Supply Chain 38 54 1.159 (0.70) 9 0.435 (0.67
CAD Computer Ass'd Draft'g 5 7 1.115 (0.74) 10 0.636 (0.82
CRM Cust. Rel'nship Mgmt. 32 41 1.105 (0.74) 11 0.651 (0.69
ITS IT Sourcing 9 13 1.030 (0.65) 12 0.816 (0.70
SIS System Integration Servs. 10 16 0.856 (0.73) 13 1.123 (0.77
SM Storage Management 5 7 0.747 (0.72) 14 3.518 (1.20
MW Middleware 16 19 0.686 (0.51) 15 0.940 (0.85
BI Business Intelligence 20 27 0.407 (0.58) 16 0.665 (0.73
INF Infrastructure 39 55 0.391 (0.73) 17 0.623 (0.64
DW Data Warehouse 5 7 0.378 (0.61) 18 0.596 (0.92
BPM Bus. Process Mgmt. 3 3 0.369 (0.47) 19 0.128 (0.68
CDM Content/Doc. Mgmt. 22 28 0.055 (0.95) 20 0.253 (1.06
AD Application Dev'l'pm't 42 61 0.000 - 21 0.000 -
EAI Enterprise Appl. Integr'n 26 36 -0.671 (0.84) 22 -0.576 (1.00
EB E-Business Applications 31 44 -0.852 (1.09) 23 0.472 (0.78
ERP Enterprise Res. Planning 44 62 -1.409 (0.72) 24 -0.898 (0.91
FI Financial Applications 29 42 -2.258 (1.14) 25 -1.930 (1.41
Poisson Model Neg. Bino
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4. Significance and Conclusion 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways.  First, it provides a 
useful extension of the literature (cited in note 5, supra) showing a substantial variation in 
the use of patents in different industries.  Our work provides a much more detailed 
example of ways in which the use of patents can differ markedly even within the confines 
of a single industry.  Similarly, by providing a quantitative link between patenting 
propensity and business models, our work provides substantial evidence that patenting, at 
least in this industry, is a regularized and important part of a well-organized operation, 
rather than a random or happenstance occurrence.  Finally, the paper is important simply 
for shedding light on the operations of patents in an industry in which they are highly 
controversial.  Although we cannot answer the ultimate welfare question – would the 
industry be better without patents than it is with patents – we do shed a great deal of light 
on the reasons why so many firms do – and do not – choose to expend the time and 
resources necessary to obtain patents to protect their innovative work. 
